This paper analyzes the interaction between intergenerational wealth transmission, human capital investments under uninsurable labor income risk, and economic growth in a small open overlapping-generations economy with heterogeneous agents. It demonstrates how the role of the personal income distribution for an economy's process of development through risky human capital accumulation depends on the shape of the saving function. Consistent with recent empirical evidence, the analysis suggests that the impact of higher inequality on the aggregate human capital stock, and thus, on growth may be positive. This result rests on two features of the model, which both are largely supported by empirical evidence. First, as shown under weak conditions, children's human capital investments are positively affected by parents' income. Second, the marginal propensity to save is increasing in income.
Introduction
This paper analyzes the interaction between intergenerational wealth transmission, human capital investments under uninsurable labor income risk, and economic growth in a small open overlapping-generations economy with heterogeneous agents. It demonstrates how the role of the personal income distribution for an economy's process of development through risky human capital accumulation depends on the shape of the saving function.
The analysis suggests that despite diminishing individual returns to educational investments the impact of higher inequality on the aggregate human capital stock and thus on growth may be positive during the transition to a stationary equilibrium. This result rests on two features of the model, which both are largely supported by empirical evidence. First, children's human capital investments are positively affected by parents' income.
1 For advanced countries, this evidence is surprising at the Þrst glance because credit constraints for human capital investments do not seem to be binding for most individuals (or are, at least, negligible). 2 However, uninsurable labor income risk systematically affects incentives of risk-averse individuals to invest in human capital, an effect which has received surprisingly little attention in the growth literature. 3 For instance, individuals face idiosyncratic and nondiversiÞable risk associated with labor demand shocks for speciÞc skills. Moreover, among other sources, they face health and disability risk, uncertainty about the quality of schooling, and risk regarding access to social networks and other social factors which affect individual labor market prospects.
The second crucial ingredient of the model which gives rise to a potentially positive relationship between inequality and growth is that the marginal propensity to save is increasing in income (e.g., Menchik and David, 1983; Dynan et al., 2000 Dynan et al., , 2002 . According to the model, adults save in order to bequeath or to make inter vivos gifts, respectively. 4 Intergenerational transfers are optimally allocated to human capital investments and savings for future wealth of the young. 5 With an increasing marginal propensity to save, higher inequality implies that the average reduction in wealth transmission of the rich may outweigh the average increase in wealth transmission of the poor despite diminishing individual returns to educational investments. Consequently, aggregate human capital investment may fall.
The question how the personal income distribution affects an economy's process of development has stimulated both macroeconomic theory and growth empirics in the last decade like almost no other one. Whereas earlier empirical evidence suggests a negative link between inequality and growth (e.g., Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabillini, 1994; Perotti, 1996) , using a new and comprehensive high-quality data set, Deininger and Squire (1998) and Banerjee and Dußo (2003) Þnd practically none, whereas Li and Zou (1998) and Forbes (2000) report a positive relationship. Interestingly, allowing for a non-linear impact of inequality on GDP growth, Barro (2000) Þnds a negative relationship for developing countries and a positive relationship for more advanced countries.
A positive relationship between inequality and growth in advanced countries is difÞcult to reconcile with more recent theoretical approaches in the literature on income distribution and macroeconomics. 6 In their pioneering work, Galor and Zeira (1993) show that inequality typically has an adverse effect on the process of development if credit markets are imperfect ("credit-market imperfections approach"). This is because poor individuals cannot borrow sufficiently high amounts to Þnance an indivisible level of schooling investments. 7 Hence, the credit-market imperfections approach is consis- 4 Such a "joy of giving" saving motive has received strong empirical support. See Carroll (2000) for an illuminating discussion of the empirical evidence. 5 The basic structure of the model builds on Galor and Moav (2004) in a way discussed throughout the paper. 6 For surveys of this literature, see e.g. Aghion et al. (1999) and Grossmann (2001, ch. 1) . 7 As shown by Bénabou (1996) and Moav (2002) , a negative relationship between inequaliy and growth can also be obtained by replacing this non-convexity in the education technology by the tent with evidence of a negative relationship between inequality and growth in developing countries. In contrast, in the theory proposed in this paper, individuals do not face any borrowing constraints to Þnance educational investments. Thus, the present model is particularly capable to shed light into the relationship between inequality and growth in advanced countries. Both the credit-market imperfections approach and the theory proposed in the present paper may thus be viewed as complementary. 8 The mechanism underlying a potentially positive effect of inequality on growth proposed by the theory developed in this paper provides an alternative to the classical view, which argues that wealth inequality is positively related to investment-driven growth. 9 The foundation of the classical view by Bourguignon (1981) shows that under an increasing marginal propensity to save, unegalitarian stable equilibria are even
Pareto superior to an egalitarian stable equilibrium in the neoclassical growth model of Stiglitz (1969) . The reason for this result is that physical capital accumulation, fueled by domestic savings, raises wages such that growth "trickles down" to less wealthy individuals. This mechanism is excluded in the present small open economy framework.
assumption of diminishing marginal returns to human capital investment. This implies that the aggregate human capital stock increases if educational investment is spread more equally. Another strand of literature deals with the role of imperfect capital markets for the relationship between wealth distribution and entrepreneurship, when project sizes (i.e., required physical capital investments to become entrepreneur) are Þxed (e.g., Newman, 1991, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997) . 8 Besides the credit market imperfections approach, it has been argued that high inequality is adversely related to growth because it induces high demand for redistributive taxation in the political process (e.g., Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994) , high fertility (e.g., Perotti, 1996) , high social instability (e.g., Venieris and Gupta, 1986; Alesina and Perotti, 1996) , low aggregate demand for R&D-intensive products (Zweimüller, 2000) , and a low degree of specialization of labor (Fishman and Simhon, 2002) . Some other contributions, although suggesting a positive relationship between inequality and growth, are relevant for developing contries only. For instance, if capital markets are imperfect and borrowing constraints are binding even for the rich (i.e., in very poor countries), redistribution to the rich enables more individuals to Þnance education (e.g., Perotti, 1993; Moav, 2002) . Moreover, Galor and Tsiddon (1997) argue that for relatively poor economies, equality in the distribution of human capital may be an impedient to prosperity in the longer run under two conditions: Þrst, the individuals' level of human capital positively depends on the parental level of human capital and, second, technological progress depends on the average level of human capital in the economy.
9 Galor and Moav (2004) offer a uniÞed approach which combines the classical view and the creditmarket imperfections approach. Hypothesizing a co-linear saving function in a closed economy model, they show that inequality and growth are positively related in early stages of development when physical capital accumulation is the prime engine of growth, but are negatively related in mature stages of development when human capital accumulation is the prime engine of growth and borrowing constraints are still binding for the poor. Rather, the model offers a mechanism which accounts for the crucial role of human capital accumulation under idiosyncratic human capital risk in modern societies. It shows that even in a small open economy, in which national savings are unrelated to physical capital investment, the relationship between inequality and an economy's the process of development critically depends on intergenerational wealth transmission and thus on savings behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure of the model. Section 3 analyzes individual education and saving decisions. Section 4 examines the role of inequality for aggregate income dynamics. Section 5 discusses the main ingredients and results of this paper in the light of empirical evidence. The last section concludes. Some technicalities as well as an illustrative example are relegated to an appendix.
The Model
Consider a small open overlapping-generations economy with uninsurable risk of educational investments.
Production of Final Output
In every period, a single homogenous consumption good is produced according to a neoclassical, constant-returns-to-scale production technology. Output at time t, Y t , is
where K t and H t are the amounts of physical capital and human capital employed in period t, the latter being measured in efficiency units. f(·) is a strictly monotonic increasing and strictly concave function which fulÞlls lim k→∞ f 0 (k) = 0 and lim
Output is sold to the world market in a perfectly competitive environment, with output price normalized to unity. The rate of return to capital, r t , is internationally given and time-invariant, i.e., r t =r. Thus, proÞt maximization of the representative Þrm in any period t implies that k t is given byr = f 0 (k t ). Thus,
Consequently, the wage rate per efficiency unit of human capital, w t , reads
e., the gross domestic product) grows at the same rate as the aggregate human capital stock H t .
10

Individuals and Education Technology
In each period, there is a unit mass of individuals with two-period lives. In the Þrst period, individuals live by their parents and devote their entire time to acquire education. In the second period (adulthood), individuals supply their efficiency units of human capital to the labor market, and allocate their income between consumption and transfers to their offspring (i.e., bequests or inter vivos transfers, respectively).
Intergenerational transfers (i.e., savings of adults) are optimally allocated (either by parent or child) between human capital investment and savings of the young for future wealth.
11 Individuals are identical with respect to their preferences and their ability to acquire human capital, but may differ in family wealth. So far, this overlappinggenerations structure follows Galor and Moav (2004) . However, in contrast to their model, individuals face idiosyncratic human capital risk. Moreover, in order to focus on this aspect and to make the analysis particularly applicable to advanced countries in which credit constraints to Þnance higher education seem to play a minor role, I assume that individuals can freely borrow for educational purposes, e.g. due to government lending. 12 (In contrast, developing countries do not have this type of institution, and thus are not focus of the present analysis.) However, as a matter of fact, even in advanced countries human capital risk is uninsurable (e.g. Arrow, 1971) , which is 10 The capital-skill complementarity underlying production function (1) is empirically well supported; see e.g. Goldin and Katz (1998) . This technology is common in the literature on income distribution, human capital and growth.
11 Human capital investments can be thought of both schooling and nonschooling forms of training. 12 The present model also differs to Galor and Moav (2004) in that our small open economy assumption excludes the feedback mechanism from aggregate savings to factor prices which also underlies the results in Bourguignon (1981) . Moreover, in order to study the role of savings behavior for the relationship between inequality and growth, no particular functional form on utility is imposed. therefore assumed.
An individual i born in period t (a member i of generation t) with investment e i t (in units of the consumption good) in education obtains
efficiency units of human capital.ã is a random variable which follows an i.i.d. process
and is drawn each period from a (cumulative) distribution function Φ(ã) with support
The random shock realizes only after investment decisions are made,
i.e., in the beginning of the second period of life. The function h(e, a) fulÞlls the following properties.
A1. For all a ∈ A, h e (e, a) > 0, h ee (e, a) < 0, h a (e, a) > 0, h ea (e, a) > 0, lim e→∞ h e (e, a) = 0 and lim e→0 + h e (e, a) = ∞.
(h e denotes the Þrst partial derivative of h with respect to e, etc.) h ee < 0 implies that expected marginal returns to educational investment are diminishing. 13 Moreover,
given that h a > 0 which merely serves as a convention, h ea > 0 implies that the variance of earnings increases with human capital investment e. 14 Finally, the latter two conditions in A1 ensure interior solutions with respect to educational investment decisions.
15
Denote by s 13 This reßects the fact that "human capital is inherently embodied in humans and the existence of physiological constraints subjects its accumulation at the individual level to diminishing returns" (Galor and Moav, 2004, p. ??) .
14 See Levhari and Weiss (1974) for a discussion of this assumption and supporting empirical evidence. For more recent evidence, see Martins (2002, 2003) . A similar type of risk also underlies the model of Bénabou (2002) . There are other notions of labor income risk. For instance, Gould et al. (2001) argue that an increasing variance of sectoral shocks increase educational attainment of workers which differ in ability because general education reduces the costs of moving across sectors.
15 The modelling strategy to assume that human capital investment is riskier than physical capital investment seems plausible (Krebs, 2003) . First, human capital risk is nondiversiÞable since embodied in individuals, whereas diversiÞed portfolios of Þnancial capital can be held. Second, many forms of Þnancial assets in advanced countries are indeed almost risk-free (e.g. government bonds). amount of wealth received by member i of generation t, respectively, i.e., s
Thus, income of member i of generation t as an adult is given by
whereR ≡ 1 +r. Utility U i t of member i of generation t is given by a utility function u which is deÞned over consumption c i t+1 as an adult and transfer b i t+1 to her offspring ("joy of giving"), i.e.,
Thus, u is strictly monotonic increasing and strictly concave, which, as will become apparent below, implies risk aversion of individuals. Moreover, the latter two relations in A2 imply normality of intergenerational transfers b i t+1 , which is the empirically relevant case.
Finally, assume that there are two groups of dynasties in the initial period t = 0.
A fraction λ ∈ (0, 1) of ("rich") young individuals in t = 0 receives a transfer b 16 Introducing endogenous growth, e.g. by assuming that the aggregate human capital stock H t enters the education technology as positive externality (following Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992, among others), i.e., letting h i t+1 = h(e i t ,ã, H t ), does not alter the main insights of this paper. The main focus lies on the impact of initial inequality (in t = 0) on subsequent growth averaged over a longer period (i.e. on Y t /Y 0 − 1, and thus on Y t , t ≥ 1), in order to address the empirical literature on inequality and growth (see section 5.1 for a discussion). Introducing endogenous growth through human capital accumulation simply implies that initial inequality also affects the period-by-period growth rate Y t /Y t−1 − 1 in a qualitatively similar fashion as Y t both during transition to a stationary equilibrium and in the long run.
Individual Decisions
Note that income I 
under A2.
From the optimal allocation of income earned as an adult, we can derive the fol-
Of course, this is nothing else than showing that strict concavity of u implies strict quasiconcavity of u.
lowing properties of indirect life-time utility,
Lemma 2. Under A2. v(I) is a strictly monotonic increasing and strictly concave function.
according to (8), (6) and the envelope theorem. Thus, v
Substituting (7) into the latter expression, we obtain v 
, where E is the expectation operator. Thus, using (3), the optimal human capital investment is given by
18 Note that A 0 (I) < 0 if and only if −v 000 (I)/v 00 (I) > A(I), i.e., −v 0 (I) is "more concave" that v(I). See, e.g., Gollier (2001) for a discussion of the plausibility of this assumption. See also Carroll (2002) for empirical evidence which is consistent with decreasing absolute risk aversion in the context of portfolio decisions in Þnancial markets.
One can then derive the following result.
Proposition 1. (Human capital investment)
. Under A1 and A3, the human capital investment is strictly increasing in family wealth, i.e., e 0 (b
Proposition 1 coincides with a result (derived from a two-period model with exogenous wealth) of the pioneering work by Levhari and Weiss (1974) . (See also Eaton and Rosen, 1980 .) The intuition for the result is the following. Under convention h a > 0, the assumption h ea > 0 implies that risk is increasing with the level of investment in human capital. In contrast, investing in physical capital (i.e., Þnancial assets) is risk-free. Hence, if the degree of absolute risk aversion, A(I), is decreasing in income A4. The impact of a change in family wealth b i t on the magnitude of the marginal propensity to invest in education is negligible, i.e., |e 00 (b
19 Note that without uncertainty, i.e., if a =ā ≡ a, the optimal schooling investment is given by W h e (e i t , a) = R, according to (9). Thus, under certainty, e i t is independent of b i t . For instance, this coincides with a result by Galor and Moav (2004) when credit constraints are not binding in their model. 20 There exist some estimates for the impact of parental income on children's earnings which allow for non-linearity. Whereas Becker and Tomes (1986) suggest that the marginal impact is diminishing, if anything, Behrman and Taubman (1990) Þnd a positive marginal impact. To see how these Þndings relate to the present model, Þrst, deÞne earnings of a member i of generation t as function of her parent's income (suppressingã): E(I 
Thus, for instance, E 00 (I) ≈ 0 if e 00 (b) ≈ 0 and the effects driven h ee < 0 and b 00 (I) > 0 (which is the empirically relevant case as argued in section 5.2) approximately cancel. Assumption A4 is not crucial for any of the mechanisms discussed in the subsequent analysis. However, it helps to focus the discussion on the role of diminishing marginal returns to human capital and the effects arising from intergenerational wealth transmission for the inequality-growth relationship.
The Role of Inequality for Income Dynamics
This section studies the aggregate behavior of the economy which results from individual decisions analyzed in the preceding section. In particular, it is examined how inequality in initial family wealth, for a given initial aggregate transfer B 0 (and con-
, affects the process of development. For this purpose, it is useful to recall the dynamical system of the considered economy.
A given transfer b i t to a member i of generation t is optimally allocated to savings, s i t , and education investments, e i t = e(b i t ), in period t (Proposition 1). According to (2), this leads to an individual amount
of efficiency units of human capital, supplied during adulthood (which is a random variable). Thus, denoting the economy's c.d.f. of family wealth in period t by Ψ t (b),
with support B t ⊂ R + , 21 the aggregate human capital stock at t + 1 is given by
Aggregate income is given by Y t+1 = H t+1 f (k).
22
21 Note from the assumptions on initial conditions that B 0 = {b
22 Note that the human capital risk considered in the model is consistent with risk associated with skill speciÞcity in the following sense. Suppose individuals acquire skills which are applicable in a single "industry" only (which may also be interpreted as speciÞc task) and there are ideosyncratic productivity shocks across industries (Wildasin, 2000) . To see that this is consistent with the risk considered here, suppose there is a continuum [0, 1] of intermediate goods industries, indexed by j. Output q t (j) in industry j at t is produced with industry-speciÞc human capitalĤ
According to (3) and (10), given realization a of the random variableã after educational investments are made, income in t + 1 of an adult individual i reads
I i t+1 is then optimally allocated to consumption, c i t+1 , and transfers to the offspring,
According to (13), the wealth transfer within each dynasty i follows a discrete time For simplicity, let me restrict attention to the case in which even for the worst realizations ofã, income of an adult increases (without bound) with the amount of transfer received as child. 23 Formally, this means the following.
where where θ(j) is the realization of an i.i.d. shockθ. (Note that because industries are symmetric and b andθ are independently distributed, skill supply across industries is fully symmetric.) Suppose this production technology simply reads q t (j) =Ĥ t (j). Thus, the the aggregate stock of human capital in period t + 1,
is the realization of the shock in industry j ∈ [0, 1] (i.e., after realization of shocks, industries are ordered such that j = Φ(a), where a is a realization ofã). Thus, one can write
, which coincides with (11). 23 Moreover, it is implicitly assumed throughout the paper that any young individual with zero wealth is able to pay back the loanRe(0), which equals such an individual's optimal amount of lending, by her labor income even for the worst realization of the shock a, i.e.,Î(0, a) =wh(e(0), a)−Re(0) ≥ 0. Lemma 3. Under A2 and A5, for all a ∈ A. There exists b a ≥ 0 such that
A5. For all
Proof. Recall from Lemma 1 (which is implied by A2) that there exists I ≥ 0 such that b(I) > 0 and b 
Lemma 4. Under A1-A5, for any realization a ∈ A of the random shockã.
Proof. First, note that (whenever differentiable)
24 Using (12), it is easy to check that e 0 (b) ≤ 1 is sufficient forÎ b (b, a) > 0 to hold. That is, if a marginal increase in b does not lead to a decline of investment in the Þnancial market, thenÎ b > 0. However, although plausible, e 0 (b) ≤ 1 is not ensured by the assumptions made so far. One can show,
hã(e(b),a)he(e(b),a) , or if |h ee | is sufficiently large. 25 Note that in the case b(I) = 0 for I ≤ I and b(I) > 0 for I > I, I ≥ 0, the function b(I) is not differentiable at I = I (and b 0 (I) > 0 for I > I under A2, according to Lemma 1). The subsequent analysis neglects this for simplicity, implicitly stating results for I 6 = I only.
according to (13)-(15). Hence,
Moreover, according to (12) and (15), we havẽ
a ∈ A. Under A4, we can neglect the second summand on the right-hand side of (19), i.e.,Ĩ 
Inequality and the Process of Development
Recall that, initially, there are two groups of individuals, rich and poor, and the aggregate initial transfer is B 0 = λb
To study the role of inequality for the growth process, suppose the distribution of initial transfers changes (in a lump-sum fashion) to
i.e., aggregate family wealth, B 0 , is held constant. Under restriction ε < (1−λ)(b
, the economy is said to be more equal, the higher ε. The following analysis derives comparative-static results with respect to changes in ε. Under (20), the aggregate human capital stock in period 1, H 1 , can be written as
according to (11) and the speciÞcation of the initial distribution of transfers. From this, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2. (Impact of higher equality in the short run). Under A1, A3 and A4, higher equality of initial family wealth is associated with higher aggregate income Y 1 (and thus, faster growth g 1,0 ), i.e.,Ĥ 0 1 (ε) > 0.
Proof. According to (22), differentiatingĤ 1 (ε) with respect to ε yieldŝ
a ∈ A, according to (10) and (21). Since ù b
according to (24). The Þrst summand on the right-hand side of (25) Proposition 2 is in line with a standard result in the literature on inequality and growth when growth is driven by human capital investments (e.g., Galor and Zeira, 1993; Bénabou, 1996; Moav, 2002) . Intuitively, higher equality fosters growth when the poor have a higher expected marginal return to education. This applies when two conditions are met. First, individual human capital investment is an increasing function of wealth (usually derived from borrowing constraints rather than from uncertainty as in the present paper), which holds since e 0 (·) > 0, according to Proposition 1. Second, marginal returns to education are diminishing, which is reßected by the assumption h ee < 0 in A1. Hence, the aggregate human capital stock typically increases in the short run if (initial) wealth, and thus, if (initial) educational investment is spread over the population more equally. However, as will become apparent in the following, due to the effects of intergenerational wealth transmission, this may not hold anymore in the medium run.
Medium Run Impact of Higher Equality
Given family wealth b i t in period t, human capital of a member i of generation t + 1 in period t + 2 is
according to (10), (21), (13) and (14). For later use, the following auxiliary results are established.
Lemma 5. Under A1-A3 and A5, for any realizations of random shocks,h
according to (10), (21) and (26). Substituting (16) into (27) leads tõ 
The Þrst summand on the right-hand side of (29) is non-positive since h ee < 0. Moreover, if |e 00 (b)| is small in magnitude as supposed in A4, the Þrst term in square brackets of (29) Given ù b i 0 , the intergenerational transfer within dynasty i in period 1, after realization a 0 ∈ A of the shock at t = 0, is given by ù b Thus, using (20) and (26), the aggregate human capital stock in period 2 may be written as
This leads to the following result. The intuition of Lemma 7 is as follows. On the one hand, a diminishing marginal return to human capital investment leads to a positive impact of higher equality of family wealth on H 2 , i.e., the short run effect of higher equality on the aggregate human capital stock which underlies Proposition 2 also applies two periods after a lump-sum redistribution. To see this intuitively, recall that the wealth transfer from parent to child is an increasing function of parent's income. Consequently, an increase in ε implies that members of generation 0 which belong to a poor dynasty (endowed with b P 0 ) are, on average, richer as parents, and thus transfer, on average, more to their offspring (i.e., to members of generation 1). In turn, on average, members of generation 1 from poor families invest more in education whereas the opposite holds for rich dynasties (with family wealth b R 0 in the initial period). Hence, on the other hand, and in contrast to the short run effect of higher equality, the impact of an increase in ε on the aggregate human capital stock in period 2, H 2 , also depends on the intergenerational wealth transmission as function of parents' income. As a consequence, the positive effect from h ee < 0 on aggregate human capital investment may be dominated: Poor dynasties transmit more wealth, on average, when ε is higher, rich dynasties transmit less. Thus, despite diminishing marginal returns to education, reßected by h ee < 0, H 2 = H 2 (ε) may decrease with ε. Intuitively, the "more convex" b(I) and the "less concave"
h(e, ·) in e is, the "more likely" isĤ 0 2 (ε) < 0, which reßects a positive relationship between inequality and growth.
To draw conclusions for the role of (initial) inequality for the process of development in the medium run, i.e., to examine the impact of an increase in ε on the growth rate
where (26) has been used. Thus, recalling (20), the aggregate human capital stock in period 3 may be written as
As can be seen from comparing (33) with (30), the structure of the development process through wealth transmission and human capital investments remains similar from period 2 onwards. In fact, in line with Lemma 7, the following can be concluded. Proof. Note that (33) implieŝ
according to the deÞnitionh
implies that H 0 3 (ε) > (=, <)0 if, for instance, for all realizations a 0 , a 1 , a 2 ∈ A at t = 0, 1, 2, and for all b ∈ R + ,h In an analogous fashion, part (ii) of Proposition 3 follows from (36) together with part (ii) of Lemma 4 and part (ii) of Lemma 6. Thus, the impact of an increase in ε on H 3 is similar to its impact on H 2 , where the latter has been established in Lemma 7.
The impact of an increase in ε on H 4 and higher can be established in a completely analogous fashion, employing a very similar structure, which yields similar results. This concludes the proof.
Proposition 3 shows that the medium run impact of higher equality on human capital accumulation and growth crucially depends on the properties of the saving function. Whether part (i) or part (ii) of Proposition 3 is the relevant case is thus an empirical question, which is addressed in section 5.2.
Inequality and Aggregate Income in Stationary Equilibrium
What is the impact of initial inequality on the aggregate human capital stock and per capita income in the long run (i.e., as t → ∞), denoted by H ∞ and Y ∞ = H ∞ f(k), respectively? Answering this question requires an analysis of the long run behavior of wealth transfers within dynasties, which are governed by the Markov process b
, deÞned by (13). Due to the uncertainty in the model, these transfers never reach steady state points as known from deterministic models. Therefore, the goal is to Þnd stationary equilibria in the sense that, as t → ∞, the distribution of b i t within dynasty i is time-invariant. The following discussion of such stationary equilibria, and its consequences for the relationship between inequality and per capita income in the long run deals with simple cases in a rather informal way. Both a more formal and more general treatment is provided in appendix B.
To focus the discussion on empirically plausible situations, suppose intergenerational transfers are zero for low levels of income.
27 Moreover, to prevent inÞnite wealth accumulation of rich dynasties, suppose that for high wealth levels b i and for a = a,ā,
is strictly concave as function of b i . 28 Simple cases which meet these two criteria are depicted in Fig. 1 . 29 Appendix B shows that the main conclusions derived from <Figure 1> 27 For the US, for instance, it has been frequently conÞrmed that the mean savings rate of households in the lowest quintile of the income distribution is non-positive (e.g., Browning and Lusardi, 1996; Dynan et al., 2000) . 28 Note that according to (17) and (19), even if b 00 (I) > 0, for high I, this occurs under weak conditions since h ee < 0. for i = R, P , such that the distribution of wealth levels of all dynasties converge with probability one to the trivial stationary equilibrium. 32 In this case, sufficient redistribution to the rich 30 For illuminating discussions of this stationary equilibrium indeterminacy in stochastic models, see, e.g., Laitner (1981) and Wang (1993) . 31 More precisely, this refers to any increase in ε small enough such that ù b
implying that the distribution of wealth holdings of initially rich dynasties still converges with probability one to a locally unique stationary equilibrium on the interval [d a , dā] .
32 This reßects a poverty trap of the kind often encountered in the literature on inequality and growth (which here is derived from a stochastic model). Thus, even if there is a systematic relationship between initial inequality and aggregate income in the short run and medium run (see Propositions 2 and 3 in section 4.1), one cannot draw general conclusions regarding the relationship between initial inequality and Y ∞ from the shape of the saving function. However, whereas higher inequality may help to overcome a poverty trap in poor economies, if anything, the analysis suggests that the relationship between initial inequality and long run income is negative for advanced countries.
Empirical Relevance
This section reviews empirical evidence regarding crucial features and results of the theory developed in this paper.
The Inequality-Growth Relation Revisited
The present paper has suggested a channel through which initial inequality may have a positive impact on the growth rate of aggregate income in the medium run. To address this result in the light of empirical evidence, Þrst, it should be noted that the usual modelling approach in growth empirics relies on some hypothesis of conditional convergence (e.g., Barro, 1991 Barro, , 2000 . That is, regression analysis regarding the determinants of economic growth, like inequality of income, usually control for the level of per capita income in some base year (properly instrumented) to account for the stage of development of an economy, like initial GDP, Y 0 .
33 This focus on the transition path enables us to compare the hypotheses derived in section 4.1 (particularly regarding the medium run) with empirical evidence in this literature.
The earlier literature has suggested a negative effect of income inequality on growth (e.g., Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabillini, 1994; Perotti, 1996) , which however, is not based on panels. Using a new and comprehensive high-quality data set, Deininger and Squire (1998) and Banerjee and Dußo (2003) Þnd practically none, whereas Li and Zou (1998) and Forbes (2000) report a positive and signiÞcant medium run effect. 34 The most interesting results for the present paper, however, emerge in a recent study of Barro (2000), who allows income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient, using the same data set as Deininger and Squire, 1998) . 35 From these results, Barro (2000, p.18) concludes that "for rich countries, where credit constraints are less serious, the growth-promoting aspects of inequality may dominate". To the best of my knowledge, the only available theory which has been consistent with a potentially positive relationship between inequality and growth in advanced countries so far rests on the classical view: that is, higher inequality may enhance growth through physical 33 Usually, Y 0 has signiÞcant effects, suggesting that observed economies are not yet close to stationary equilibria.
34 Banerjee and Dußo (2003) suggest that the change in inequality, in either direction, rather then its level is negatively associated with growth. Moreover, on basis of this Þnding, they argue that previous panel studies (particularly those relying on Þxed effects) may have produced upward biased estimates of the effect of inequality on growth. 35 For developing countries, a negative relationship between inequality and growth is consistent with the view that high inequality leads to social unrest (e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1996) , high fertility (e.g., Perotti, 1996) , and low human capital investment (e.g., due to borrowing constraints; see Galor and Zeira, 1993) , in turn, being associated with slow growth. Evidence by Perotti (1996) largely supports these channels. capital accumulation. However, this mechanism crucially depends on the assumption of (at least partially) closed economies such that investment in physical capital is related to national savings. In contrast, the theory proposed in this paper rests on the role of intergenerational wealth transmission for human capital accumulation in a small open economy. Abstracting from borrowing constraints for human capital investments renders the model particularly relevant for advanced economies.
The remainder of this section provides empirical evidence for the forces suggested by the present analysis which are necessary to obtain a growth-promoting medium run effect of inequality.
Saving Behavior and Intergenerational Transfers
In the model, the amount of intergenerational transfers equals the amount of savings of adult individuals. In fact, empirically, savings seem to be strongly related to inter vivos gifts and bequests, thus lending support for a crucial assumption about preferences in the model. For instance, Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) emphasize the importance of intergenerational transfers for capital accumulation in the US, a hypothesis which has been frequently conÞrmed by later evidence. In particular, as argued by Menchik and David (1983) and Dynan et al. (2000 Dynan et al. ( , 2002 , observed saving behavior in the US is empirically consistent with models hypothesizing a "joy of giving" motive for intergenerational transfers.
36 De Nardi (2003) calibrates an overlapping-generations model with voluntary and accidental bequests, arguing that voluntary bequests play a crucial role for explaining observed wealth concentration patterns not only in the US but also in Sweden.
According to the preceding analysis, if the marginal propensity to save for adults, 36 In contrast, the standard altruism (dynastic) model á la Barro (1974) seems to be inconsistent with the data. For instance, unlike predicted by the dynastic model, inheritances do not seem to compensate for earnings differences among siblings (e.g. Wilhelm, 1996) . Moreover, as discussed in Carroll (2000) , there does not seem to be an indication that the size of bequest is an increasing function of the ratio of parent's to child's lifetime income. Finally, whereas a one-dollar reduction in income of a recipient should raise inter vivos transfers from parents to child by one dollar according to the dynastic model, evidence by Altonji et al. (1997) suggests that transfers increase by just 13 cent on average, conditional on the event of a positive transfer having occurred. b 0 (·), is increasing in income, then inequality may be positively related to growth in the medium run, despite diminishing marginal returns to human capital investments (Proposition 3). This is because under individual uncertainty of returns to human capital investments, (initial) wealth inequality affects human capital accumulation through intergenerational transfers.
Evidence on US saving and bequest behavior suggests that saving rates are strongly increasing in lifetime income. 37 For instance, Dynan et al. (2000) provide estimates
(for the Þve-year period between 1984 and 1989) which imply that a $10,000 increase in (permanent) income is associated with an increase in the saving rate in a range from over 1 to roughly 5 percent, depending on the database and instruments used.
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Most importantly for the results of the theoretical model developed in the present paper, estimates from median regressions suggest that the increase in saving rates in response to an increase in income is approximately constant. 39 This implies that the marginal propensity to save is increasing as function of income, thus, being consistent with b 00 (·) > 0. In a less recent study, Menchik and David (1983) directly focus on bequest behavior. Their evidence suggests that the marginal propensity to bequeath is increasing in lifetime earnings.
Remark 1. It is important to note the difference between b 00 (·) > 0 on the one hand and an increasing average propensity of adults to save (which holds if b(I)/I is increasing in I) on the other hand. For instance, following Galor and Zeira (1993) , Moav (2002) and Galor and Moav (2004) , among others, consider the saving function 37 There is overwhelming evidence for the hypothesis that saving rates rise strongly with current income (e.g., Browning and Lusardi, 1996) . However, as pointed out by Friedman (1957) , this Þnding may just reßect a response of savings behavior to changes in transitory income. That is, if income is temporarily high, savings increase and, analogously, if income is temporarily low, savings are reduced. Over the life-cycle, however, a positive relationship between current income and saving rates may still be consistent with a constant saving rate as function of lifetime (or permanent) income.
38 Dynan et al. (2000) use three different databases to account for different measures of savings and use different instruments for permanent income like consumption, lagged and/or future earnings, and education. Using current income, a $10,000 increase in income is associated with a 8 percent increase in the saving rate. This Þgure is considerably higher than for measures of permanent income, as expected.
39 See Dynan et al. (2000, Fig. 1A-1D ). This result is basically independent on the instrument used or when no instrumenting is done. Appendix C further employs this saving function for an illustration of the analysis under a particular speciÞcation of preferences.
Educational Investment and Parental Income
Besides b 00 (·) > 0, a second necessary condition for a positive relationship between inequality and medium run growth in the model is the positive relationship between family wealth and educational investments, e 0 (·) > 0 (Proposition 1). This condition has been derived from the hypothesis that the variance of earnings increases with educational levels. In fact, there is overwhelming evidence for both this basic assumption and its implication.
First, evidence by Martins (2002, 2003) for advanced European countries (in a period between 1980 and 1995) strongly suggests that the earnings dispersion is increasing in the level of schooling, conÞrming somewhat less recent evidence discussed in Levhari and Weiss (1974) . Moreover, although credit constraints to Þnance higher education seem to be negligible in advanced countries, there is a strong positive relationship between parental social background and children's investment (or participation) in higher education. For instance, Manski (1992) Þnds that the percentage of children from low-income families in the US who graduate from high school is substantially lower than among high school graduates from other families. Similar patterns can be found in Germany. Egeln et al. (2003) report that 1996 even among those children who were eligible for university education (not more than roughly a third of all high school graduates in Germany), only 24 percent with a less favorable social background went to university, in contrast to 86 percent with a favorable social background. 40 This comparison is striking, as it is rather implausible that heterogeneity in intellectual ability (which may partly be shaped by the social background) can account for this difference among those who have already acquired eligibility ("Hochschulreife").
In his review of US evidence based on econometric studies, Taubman (1989) concludes that estimates for the elasticity of years of schooling with respect to parental income are generally positive and range from 3 to 80 percent, after controlling for parents' education, father's occupation, and/or children's test scores on mental ability tests. Accounting for similar controls, also the correlation between children's adult earnings and their parents' income is highly positive (e.g. Behrman and Taubman, 1990) . As concluded in the survey article by Solon (1999 Solon ( , p.1789 
Concluding Remarks
After more than a decade of intensive research on the relationship between inequality and growth the debate is still ongoing. This paper has proposed a theory which is consistent with a positive medium run effect of inequality on growth in advanced countries, as found in Barro (2000) . In contrast to the classical view, this alternative theory does not require any connection between national savings and physical capital investment in an economy, but rests on the role of intergenerational wealth transmission for social background.
individual incentives to invest in risky and uninsurable human capital.
First, it has been shown that, under the fairly weak requirement of decreasing absolute risk aversion (deÞned over indirect utility), individual human capital investment is increasing in parental income. This prediction is largely supported by empirical evidence even in advanced countries (in which credit-market imperfections may play a minor role). Given this positive relationship between parental income and human capital investments, if the marginal return to education is diminishing, then the expected marginal return to education is higher for poorer individuals. Thus, in the short run, initial inequality of family wealth is typically negatively linked to the aggregate human capital stock, and thus, is an impediment for the short run process of development.
However, in the medium run, the effects of intergenerational wealth transmission may overturn this short run effect of inequality on growth if the marginal propensity to save is increasing in income. In fact, this property has frequently been conÞrmed. In contrast, if the marginal propensity to save is non-increasing, the model predicts that the relationship between inequality and medium run growth is typically negative.
For the long run (i.e., in stationary equilibrium), irrespective of the properties of the saving function, the relationship between inequality and per capita income (or the long run rate of growth, respectively, allowing for endogenous growth in a straightforward way) can go either way.
It is important to note, however, that even if the inequality-growth relationship turns out to be positive, the proposed theory does not suggest a rationale for inegalitarian policies. For instance, under uninsurable human capital risk, distortionary redistribution through the tax system may enhance risk-taking by providing insurance, as suggested by the literature on portfolio choice and taxation. 41 To examine the role of the shape of the saving function for implications of redistributive taxation in a similar context as analyzed in this paper is left for future research.
where A(I) = −v 00 (I)/v 0 (I) has been used for the latter equation. DeÞne a 0 as the realization ofã such thatwh e (e, a 0 ) −R = 0. We can write
Recall from assumption A1 that h ea > 0. Thus, by the deÞnition of a 0 , the Þrst integral in (A.3) is positive, whereas the second one is negative. Moreover, note that since h a > 0,Î(b, a) is increasing in a, according to (3). Thus, A ³Î (b, a)´is strictly decreasing in a under assumption A3. Hence, under A3,
Adding up (A.4) and (A.5) and using
Under the optimal human capital investment, e(b), the left-hand side of (A.6) is zero,
Hence, e 0 (b) > 0. This concludes the proof. ¥
B. Stationary Equilibria
This appendix provides a more formal treatment of stationary equilibria and generalizes the cases discussed in section 4.2 (based on Fig. 1 ).
Let P (b, ·) be the transition function of the Markov process b
is the probability that b i is in the set Z one period after it started in b i . That is,
where Z b i ≡ {ã :b(b i ,ã) ∈ Z} and Z is a Borel set in R + . Moreover, let µ i t (Z) ≡ Pr{b i t ∈ Z} for all Z ⊂ R + , t = 0, 1, 2, ..., be the probability measure associated with b 
can deÞne a stationary equilibrium as follows.
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DeÞnition 1. (Stationary equilibrium). A stationary equilibrium for family wealth
A trivial stationary equilibrium is a stationary equilibrium which is associated with a distribution of b i such that all mass is concentrated on zero (i.e., lim t→∞ Pr{b i t = 0} = 1).
Together with DeÞnition 1, the next deÞnition leads to an important existence result.
Lemma B.1. (Wang, 1993) . There is a unique stable stationary equilibrium on a stable set I . Moreover, the convergence to the stationary equilibrium is uniform on I.
Proof. Brock and Mirman (1972), Wang (1993) .
Given these preliminaries, let S a ≡ {b ∈ R ++¯b (b, a) = 0} be the set of strictly positive transfers received by a young individual, such that the optimal transfer as adult to her offspring is zero, a ∈ A. Moreover, let b a ≡ max S a be the largest element of such a set. Suppose that the following holds.
A6. Sā is non-empty, i.e., there exists bā > 0. To analyze more general situations than global convergence to a trivial stationary equilibrium, the next assumption prevents inÞnite wealth accumulation of rich dynasties.
A7. lim b→∞bb (b, a) = 0 for all a ∈ A.
Moreover, let Θ a ≡ {b ∈ R ++¯b (b, a) = b} be the set of strictly positive Þxed points ofb(b, a), a ∈ A. In the remainder of this appendix, we focus on situations in which Θ a and Θā have the following properties.
A8. (i) Θ a is non-empty. 43 (ii) Θ a and Θā are Þnite. (iii) Let cā, dā be two adjacent elements of Θā such that cā < dā andb b (dā,ā) ≤ 1. Then there exists c a ∈ Θ a such that c a ∈ (cā, dā). (iv) Let c a , d a be two adjacent elements of Θ a such that c a < d a and
<Figure 2>, <Figure 3>
43 Note that, under A6, part (i) of A8 implies that Θā is non-empty as well.
It is easy to check that the case depicted in panel ( Note that, by applying DeÞnition 2, I 3 and I 6 in panels (a) and (b) of Fig. 3 are both stable sets, whereas in panel (c) I 3 is the unique stable set. Moreover, by replicating the arguments in Laitner (1981; section III) , the following can be concluded (ii) For all b i 0 ∈ (c, d), there is a positive probability q ∈ (0, 1) that the distribution of b i t converges to a trivial stationary equilibrium, whereas with probability 1 − q it converges to a (unique and stable) stationary equilibrium on a stable set. 
C. A Simple Example
This appendix provides a simple illustration of the analysis by specifying preferences.
Following Galor and Zeira (1993) , Moav (2002) and Galor and Moav (2004) , among others, the utility is given by 
